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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented for review on appeal:
1.

Do the undisputed facts provide sufficient support for

the summary judgment granted respondent against Western Surety
Company, surety for Claudia R. Brown and Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc.,
dba Motivation Enterprises?
2.

Is the conduct of Claudia R. Brown and/or Motivation

Enterprises as undisputed constitute fraud or fraudulent
representations or a violation of §41-3-18, Utah Code Annotated?
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3.

Is respondent a person who is within the protection of

the surety bond furnished by Western Surety Company to the State
of Utah and covering the dealer Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba
Motivation Enterprises?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts are undisputed and were presented to the trial
court by respondent and appellant as undisputed.
Claudia R. Brown obtained a loan from respondent for the
purpose of purchasing an automobile particularly described as a
1978 Porsche

924, Serial No. 1248207902.

The proceeds of the

loan were placed in the form of a cashier's check made payable to
Claudia R. Brown and Motivation Auto.

The proceeds were paid to

Motivation Enterprises but were diverted by it and never used
for the purpose of paying the purchase price of the particularly
described automobile.

Other sums never were available to buy

the automobile, so respondent's security interests were never
perfected in the security which was to have been provided by the
1978 Porsche 924.
Respondent's position is that the diversion of the funds by
Claudia R. Brown and/or Motivation Enterprises was fraud on its
rights and that, as a consequence, the appellant, by reason of
its surety bond, became liable to respondent for the damage
suffered through loss of its security.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The undisputed facts supporting the summary judgment are as
follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

A bond of motor vehicle dealer or salesman, No. 2334416,

was in effect on the 9th day of January, 1979 and thereafter until
the 10th day of May, 1979 under which defendant Western Surety
Company agreed to indemnify any and all persons, firms and
corporations for any loss suffered by reason of the fraud or
fraudulent representations made or through the violation of the
Motor Vehicle Business Act.

The bond covered all judgments and

costs adjudged against the principal Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc.,
dba Motivation Enterprises.

A General Agreement of Indemnity

(pg. 161) shows that Harold Michael Brown was the President of Bug
Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba Motivation Enterprises, and that Claudia
R. Brown was a co-signer on the General Agreement of Indemnity
with Harold Michael Brown.
B.

On the 9th of January, 1979, Brown executed a Motor

Vehicle Security Agreement with Draper Bank & Trust covering a 1978
Porsche automobile, Model 924, two-door, Serial No. 1238207920
(R. 164). On the 9th of January, 1979, Claudia Brown entered into
a promissory note agreement in the face amount of $14,184.72 (R. 165).
C.

On the 9th of January, 1979, plaintiff delivered to

Claudia Brown its cashier's check No. 46407 made payable to Claudia
Brown and Motivation Auto in the face amount of $11,500.00. On the
back thereof is the following endorsement:
Endorsement of this check constitutes an agreement to
procure a Utah Certificate of Title to automobile
for which this check represents payment showing
Draper Bank & Trust, Draper, Utah as lien holder and
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also guarantees good and clear title to said automobile
Make
Porsche 924
Year
1978
Serial # 1248207920
(R. 165A)
The check was endorsed ''Motivation Auto, by C. Brown, Vice Pres."
and was deposited in the account of Claudia Brown, dba Tac and
Togs, Inc.
D.

Out of the proceeds of the cashier's check, Claudia

Brown paid Motivation Auto approximately $11,500.00, the price of
the Porsche automobile described in the security documents
(Claudia R. Brown (Conger) deposition, pg. 23).
E.

Motivation Auto did not pay for the price of the Porsche

automobile but spent the proceeds from its purchase price (Claudia
R. Brown (Conger) deposition, pg. 25). No title was ever obtained
to the vehicle.
F.

Subsequent to the payment of the cashier's check,

Motivation Enterprises resold the Porsche automobile through the
auction.

It retained the sale price without paying Draper Bank &

Trust the loan which was to be secured by said automobile (Claudia
R. Brown (Conger) deposition, pg. 25).
G.

Payments amounting to $3,682.55 were paid to Draper Bank

& Trust on account.

There remained due and owing on the note on

the 25th of March, 1980 the sum of $7,817.45 with interest on
said sum at the rate of 14% per annum, which equals, as of the 8th
of February, 1985, a total of $12,976.20.
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H.

Neither Motivation Enterprises nor Brown are able to

pay the unsecured debt for the purchase price of the Porsche
(Claudia R Brown (Conger) deposition, pg- 33-34) (Bond cancellation
May 20, 1979) (R. 163).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Summary judgment, pursuant to respondent's motion, was
entered by the Court in the amount of $12,976.20.

The judgment

recites that the conduct of Claudia R. Brown was in fraud of the
rights of plaintiff as defined by Utah Code Annotated relating
to bonding of automobile dealers and that the bond required
appellant to pay the damages caused to plaintiff.
It is respondent's position and argument that the defendants
Brown and Motivation Enterprises committed fraud on the respondent
by diverting the proceeds of the cashier's check furnished by
respondent to pay the purchase price of the Porsche automobile
to purposes other than those for which it was intended and for
which it was entrusted to defendants.

The endorsement of the

check without using the funds for the purposes for which it was
entrusted by respondent is the fraud claimed by respondent.
It is the further argument of the respondent that the
statutes providing for the bonding of automobile dealers
specifically requires the appellant to pay all damages suffered
by respondent, and that respondent is within the scope of the
statute and among those persons whom the bonding statute requires
the surety to protect.

-5-
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DIVERSION OF THE FUNDS PROVIDED BY DRAPER BANK &
TRUST FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE AUTOMOBILE
CONSTITUTED FRAUD ON IT BY PAYEES OF THE CASHIER'S
CHECK.
POINT II
APPELLANT BECAME LIABLE ON ITS SURETY BOND TO RESPONDENT
WHEN DEFENDANTS BROWN AND MOTIVATION ENTERPRISES DIVERTED
THE PROCEEDS FROM THE CASHIER'S CHECK TO PURPOSES OTHER
THAN FOR WHICH THEY WERE ENTRUSTED.

POINT I
THE DIVERSION OF THE FUNDS PROVIDED BY DRAPER BANK &
TRUST FOR THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE AUTOMOBILE
CONSTITUTED FRAUD ON IT BY PAYEES OF THE CASHIER'S
CHECK.
Section 41-3-16 of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended,
provides for the bonding of all automobile dealers and fixes the
maximum liability at $20,000.00.

It provides that the bond be

conditioned that the applicant will conduct business as a dealer
without fraud or fraudulent representations.

Section 41-3-18,

Utah Code Annotated, then provides that there shall be a right of
action against dealers, salesman, crusher, or surety on bond and
reads as follows:
If a person suffers loss or damage by reason of
fraud, fraudulent representation, or violation of
this chapter, - - - - such person shall have a
right of action against the dealer, salesman, or
crusher guilty of the fraud, fraudulent representation,
or violation and the sureties upon their respective
bonds.

-6-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The undisputed factual situation described for the Court
shows a clear embezzlement.

The funds entrusted were used in a

manner not authorized by Draper Bank & Trust.

Defendants did not

obtain the title to the vehicle and place on said title the lien
that Draper had for the automobile purchase price.
Appellant argues through its brief that there were no
fraudulent representations by Brownin obtaining the loan from
respondent.

Appellant fails to even consider the fact that fraud

may occur in many ways other than by false representations.

It

is respondent's position that theft, embezzlement, misappropriation,
and a whole series of dishonest dealings by an automobile dealer
may subject its surety to liability if damages are suffered.
The standard and classical definition of embezzlement is
set forth in 29A Corpus Juris Secundum, §1, pg. 2, and is as
follows:
'Embezzlement1 is broadly defined as the fraudulent
appropriation of another's property by a person to
whom it has been intrusted or into whose hands it
has lawfully come.
Additional insight into the definition of fraud is found in the
Criminal Coee, Utah Code Annotated §76-6-401.

Subparagraph (4)

reads as follows:
'Obtain or exercise unauthorized control' means, but
if not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore
defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
Further information on the definitions of fraud is contained in
subparagraph (5) which defines deception.

It reads as follows:
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'Deception1 occurs when a person intentionally:
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers
property without disclosing a lien, security
interest, adverse claim, or other legal impediment
to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien,
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is
not valid or is or is not a matter of official record.
The undisputed facts show that defendant Brown paid to
defendant Bug Parts Unlimited, Inc., dba Motivation Enterprises,
the proceeds of the cashier's check as the purchase price of the
Porsche automobile.

Motivation Enterprises did not use those

proceeds for the purpose of obtaining title to the Porsche and
this is clearly embezzlement of the funds of respondent which
were entrusted to Brown and Motivation Enterprises for a specific
purpose, namely to obtain title to the Porsche.
It is also undisputed that the Porsche was then sold back
over the auto auction and its sale price was not used by
Motivation Enterprises to liquidate the loan which had been
advanced to pay the purchase price.

Respondent submits that

this kind of dishonest dealing with the proceeds of the cashier's
check, which was specifically intended to obtain title to the
Porsche, is the type of fraud that the appellant's surety bond

.

is intended to protect against.
This Court in Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, at 875
(1978), defined fraud in the following terms:
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the
multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise
and are resorted to in order to gain an advantage
over another. In its general or generic sense, it
comprises all acts, omissions and concealments
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty and
resulting damage to another. 37 C.J.S. Fraud §1.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is undisputed that Brown paid Motivation Enterprises
the price of the Porsche and Motivation Enterprises did not
obtain the title to the Porsche or place on said title the lien
that all parties understood and agreed was the purpose for which
the cashier's check proceeds were to be used.

It is respectfully

submitted that this conduct on the part of Brown and/or
Motivation Enterprises was fraud on the rights of respondent.
POINT II
APPELLANT BECAME LIABLE ON ITS SURETY BOND TO RESPONDENT
WHEN DEFENDANTS BROWN AND MOTIVATION ENTERPRISES DIVERTED
THE PROCEEDS FROM THE CASHIER'S CHECK TO PURPOSES OTHER
THAN FOR WHICH THEY WERE ENTRUSTED.
Respondent was financing the purchase by Brown of the
Porsche automobile from Motivation Enterprises.

It supplied the

funds through its cashier's check for the purpose of obtaining a
clear title.

Its interests were to be protected by the title

showing it as a lienholder and by delivery of the title to the
automobile.

Appellant argues that the fraud of Brown was not

covered by Western Surety's bond.
The law has always been clear in Utah since the early case
of Bates v. Simpson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P.2d 749.

The surety was

there held liable to the purchaser of an automobile when his funds
were not used for the purpose of obtaining title.

The facts in

the Bates case involved two used car dealers, one of whom was
providing the financing for the purchase from the other dealer.
The purchaser and the financier relied on the automobile dealer
to procure the necessary title.

When title was not procured,

the bonding company was held liable to the financier and to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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purchaser.

The Bates v. Simpson, supra, case is indistinguishable

from the facts now before the Court as undisputed.
A subsequent case decided by the Utah Supreme Court holding
the bond liable when a car dealer failed to obtain title is
Lawrence v. Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 300 P.2d 619 (1956).

One of

the several transactions before the Utah Supreme Court in the
Lawrence case involved a check made payable to the purchaser of
the automobile and to the automobile dealer selling the car,
which check was cashed and collected, as is the situation before
the Court.

When the dealer was unable to deliver title, the

balance of the purchase price was not paid.
automobile claimed forgery on the check.

The purchaser of the

It was held that the

bonding company was responsible under its dealer's bond.
Contributory negligence of the bank was held not to be a defense.
This is a transaction where the dealer was entrusted with the
check for the purchase price of the automobile.
This Court in Western Surety Company v. Redding, 626 P.2d
437, had an occasion to examine the sections of the Utah law
relating to the requirements that dealers be bonded and the
right of indemnification by the bonding company where the dealer
was unable to furnish clear title to an automobile sold in the
ordinary course of business.

The Court examined §41-3-18 Utah

Code Annotated, which is the section of our motor vehicle law
requiring bonding of dealers.

The Court held:

This statute should be construed broadly, for the
bond was intended to protect all persons doing
business with a motor vehicle dealer. Lawrence v.
Ward, 5 Utah 2d 257, 261, 300 P.2d 619 (1956)Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The holding in Western Surety, supra, was that the dealer
must then indemnify its surety where loss was sustained and paid
by the surety.

In the present case, there is the indemnification

agreement executed by both Brown and Harold Michael Brown as
President of Motivation Enterprises (R. 161). The Western Surety
v. Redding case, supra, and the indemnification agreement would
both indicate that appellant has its remedies over against the
defendants for the amount it is required to pay respondent for
its losses.
The most recent case from this Court which involves the
bonding statute is Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, Inc.,
645 P.2d 684. This case is cited by the appellant in its brief.
It does not involve the indemnification of a person dealing with
the automobile dealer as such.

The plaintiff there seeking

indemnification was a creditor of the automobile dealer.

The

Court in its holding stated as follows:
f

A person who engages in the used car business,
as in any business, must concern himself not alone
with selling but with all the myriad details
required to conduct such a business. That each
part of the business contributes to the total
success or failure is patent.1
Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. West, 74 Ariz. 359,
361, 249 P.2d 830, 832 (1952), In a more recent case,
Western Surety Co. v. Redding, Utah, 626 P.2d 437,
439 (1981), this Court emphasized that the bond 'was
intended to protect all persons doing business with
a motor vehicle dealer.1 We note that the foregoing
statement is accurate so long as the motor vehicle
dealer is himself doing business as a dealer; the
bond was never intended to indemnify all persons who
contract with a dealer in a capacity unrelated to his
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motor vehicle dealership. Consequently, this case is
reversed and remanded to the district court for a
trial to determine first, whether the agreements were
entered into by defendant in connection with its
business as a licensed motor vehicle dealer and, if so,
for resolution on the merits.
It is undisputed that the check from respondent was made
payable to both Brown and to Motivation Enterprises, the
automobile dealer, so there can be no question but that respondent
was dealing with an automobile dealer as such.
Respondent submits that it is clear that it is within the
group that is intended by the statutes of the State of Utah cited
herein to be protected, that its rights were violated by fraud
as defined and mentioned in the bonding statute, that the trial
court, on the undisputed facts, correctly ruled that appellant
is responsible for the damages suffered by respondent.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court's summary
judgment should be affirmed on this appeal.

The facts are

undisputed and the law is clear that the bond is available to
Draper Bank & Trust Company to indemnify it and pay its damages
suffered by reason of the fraud committed by defendants Brown
and/or Motivation Enterprises.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 1985.

' DWIGHT L. KING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

DWIGHT L. KING
Attorney for Respondent
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